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Markets as economizers of information: Field experimental 
examination of the “Hayek Hypothesis” 





The work of Friedrich Von Hayek contains several testable predictions about the nature of market 
processes. Vernon Smith termed the most important one the „Hayek hypothesis‟: the gains from trade can 
be realized in the presence of diffuse, decentralized information, and in the absence of price-taking 
behavior and centralized market direction. Vernon Smith tested this by surveying data on laboratory 
experimental markets and found strong support. We repeat this exercise using field experimental market 
data. Using field experiments allows us to test several other predictions. Generally speaking, we find 
support for Hayek‟s theories. 
JEL codes: B53, C90, D40, D51, D61, D82, L26 
Keywords: price dynamics; entrepreneurs; field experiment; market process 
1. Introduction 
In an effort to test Hayek‟s (1945) theories of the market process, Vernon Smith (1982) reviewed the 
extensive laboratory evidence and found it to be consistent with the Hayek hypothesis. Smith went on to 
inquire: “… does this mean that it will do comparably well in the „field‟ environment of the economy? … 
few such field experiments have been attempted,” (1982: p177). Thirty years later, many such field 
experiments have indeed been attempted; this paper picks up where Smith left off and assesses how well 
Hayek‟s theories travel in the field. 
The advantages of laboratory experimental data over naturally occurring data are well-documented (Falk 
and Heckman 2009). In the context of market experiments, the most important is the control that the 
laboratory affords the investigator, permitting him to induce demand and supply, and to have full 
knowledge of the predicted equilibrium. Field experiments complement their laboratory counterparts by, 
among other things, allowing the investigator to observe more diverse contexts and to limit the difficulties 
arising from inexperienced experimental subjects (see Harrison and List 2004 and Levitt and List 2007). 
Hayek (1945) provides several testable predictions about the market process.
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 The most important, which 
Smith (1982) denoted the „Hayek hypothesis‟, is that the gains from trade can be realized in the presence 
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of diffuse, decentralized information
3
, and in the absence of price-taking behavior and centralized market 
direction (see Davis and Williams 1991 for a more recent test). Critically, as Smith (1982) noted, these 
predictions are sometimes at odds with those of the neoclassical model.
4
 
We find that overall, Hayek‟s theories are well supported by the field experimental data. However we also 
find that there are important exceptions that open the door to refinements of Hayek‟s theories. For 
example in certain environments, the presence of experienced entrepreneurs and the dissemination of 
price information can hinder a market‟s ability to realize the gains from trade. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is an overview of experimental methods. 
Section 3 explores Hayek‟s testable theories. Section 4 reviews the field experimental evidence on these 
theories. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Experimental methods 
To fully comprehend the implications of field experimental data for Hayek‟s theories, we need to lay out 
the exact advantages implied by experimental methods in general, as well as the relevant advantages of 
field experiments. For a full discussion of laboratory experiments, see Davis and Holt (1992) or Kagel 
and Roth (1997), and for field experiments, see Harrison and List (2004). 
Laboratory experiments 
Hayek‟s market theories are more easily tested if the investigator has knowledge of the demand and 
supply schedules.
5
 In the absence of massive (and untestable) structural assumptions, this information is 
impossible to obtain from naturally occurring data. The laboratory allows the investigator to precisely 
induce the demand and supply schedules (Smith 1976, 1982). The investigator can also control (partially 
or completely): 
 The information available to market participants 
 The communication permissible between market participants 
 The contracts available to market participants 
 The horizons of interaction permissible between market participants 
                                                                                                                                                                           
2
 The strictest presentation of Hayek‟s theories precludes the testing of several of the predictions that we consider in 
this paper, e.g., arguably, according to Hayek it is impossible to know the competitive equilibrium in any market 
(experimental or otherwise). However following Smith (1982), we consider hybrid forms of Hayek‟s theories that 
take advantage of the extra control afforded by experimental settings. We further discuss this issue below. 
3
 Formally, imperfect/incomplete information and lack of common knowledge. 
4
 Perhaps more importantly, they apply in an environment where the neoclassical model typically fails to even 
articulate predictions due to Knightian uncertainty (Phelps 2006). Further, much of Hayek‟s research has focused on 
price dynamics and the role of entrepreneurs in driving the market towards equilibrium. Partially due to the 
difficulties of tractably modeling price dynamics, neoclassical economics has provided a limited range of testable 
predictions in this area.  
5
 In principle, some of the theories are testable without knowing the full schedules; however there is no doubt that a 




There are three types of field experiment which lie within a larger taxonomy (see Harrison and List 2004). 
 Conventional lab experiment: a standard subject pool of students, abstract framing and an 
imposed set of rules 
 Artefactual field experiment: same as a conventional laboratory experiments but with a non-
standard subject pool, e.g., having general members of the population participate in a laboratory 
market 
 Framed field experiment: same as an artefactual field experiment but with a field context in 
either the commodity, task, or information that the subjects can use, e.g., having professional 
traders participate in a laboratory market that functions similarly to the market in which they 
normally operate 
 Natural field experiment: same as a framed field experiment but where the environment is the 
real environment where the subjects undertake these tasks, and where the subjects are not aware 
that they are in an experiment, e.g., performing an experiment in the New York Stock Exchange 
without the knowledge of the traders 
In the case of markets with induced demand and supply schedules, natural field experiments are 
impossible. Compared to the remaining field experiments, laboratory experiments potentially suffer from 
the following drawback (see Harrison and List 2004, Levitt and List 2007, Falk and Heckman 2009): 
subjects may be inexperienced in the task, and self-selection into the experiment may bias results. For 
example, the outcomes of a market may depend upon the inept traders having been whittled out, which is 
much less likely to have occurred in a laboratory experiment. This may be particularly important in the 
context of Hayek‟s theories. 
An additional advantage of field experiments is the ability to consider longer-term issues such as 
reputation. When using students as subjects in an unnatural environment, reputational horizons rarely 
extend into months or years, in contrast to using subjects drawn from the natural environment being 
studied; field experiments extend the domain of analysis. 
Even setting aside these potential advantages of field experiments, it is useful to extend the domain of 
inquiry to as many different markets as possible purely as a standard act of robustness-checking. Most 
likely, this is what Smith (1982) had in mind when he posed the question about the generalizability of the 
laboratory support for Hayek‟s theory to field settings. We very much regard laboratory experiments and 
field experiments as complements in the study of market processes. 
3. Hayek’s testable theories 
Framework 
Hayek‟s testable theories can be reduced to predictions about features of trading institutions that increase 
the likelihood of efficient trades occurring. A simple framework for articulating them requires the 
following components, most of which are taken from a standard textbook treatment of general 
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equilibrium: a commodity space     ; a set of traders             indexed by  ; for each trader  , 
a utility function       , an endowment vector      and a production set     
  (where   
      ). 
An allocation                             
    is a specification of a consumption vector 
     and production vector       for each trader  . An allocation       is feasible if for every 
commodity          ,                  . This environment allows us to define (Pareto) 
efficiency in the usual way: a feasible allocation       such that there exists no other feasible allocation 
        where      
              and      
          for some  . 
When utility is transferable, the aggregate utility from an allocation is                .
6
 Normalize 
the aggregate utility under autarky        (where every trader only consumes their endowment) to zero, 
and let   denote the largest feasible aggregate utility. Then the efficiency of an allocation       is 
defined as               ; this is equivalent to the proportion of efficient rents realized. 
On top of this skeleton, we overlay the rules of a specific market institution and the related information 
structure. Traders interact by exchanging messages over time with other traders. The most important 
messages are typically offering trade prices and accepting trade offers. Other messages correspond to the 
general bargaining process. Specific markets may have rules about the messages that can be exchanged; 
for example, in an English auction, a central (non-trading) auctioneer is the only person who calls out 
prices, and the traders are restricted to expressing a willingness to trade at the prevailing price. 
Traders usually differ in their information sets depending on the market institution. First and foremost, 
they are (typically) imperfectly/incompletely informed about other traders‟ preferences and production 
sets. In some markets, an individual trader may be better-informed about the preferences of another trader 
over a specific unit than the latter trader himself, e.g., the lemons problem (Akerlof 1970). Traders can 
also vary in their knowledge of previous messages exchanged by other traders (e.g., offers and trade 
prices), both within and beyond the current trading session. 
Traders differ in their trading ability, which captures bargaining ability, cognitive ability etc. For the 
purposes of analyzing Pareto efficiency, we assume that the trader ability does not interact with 
preferences over different allocations. Thus ability determines, for example, the probability that a trader 
successfully trades and the trading surplus that accrues to him conditional on trading according to the 
trading institution. 
In response to the imperfect information, traders form beliefs; we do not restrict these beliefs to being 
rational; thus we allow for the possibility of unknown unknowns: traders not even being aware of the 
possibility that certain features of the market exist. Upon learning their preferences and forming their 
beliefs, traders interact using messages subject to the rules of the institution. Their choices need not be 
strictly rational; they can be near-rational (e.g., Gjerstad and Dickhaut 1998) or they may involve 
heuristics. 
                                                     
6
 Experimental settings (and models of experimental settings) almost always have transferable utility by virtue of 
expressing financial wealth as the objective. 
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This framework is useful because if we operationalize Hayek‟s theories, the principal dependent variable 
is the efficiency of an allocation, and the principal explanatory variables are features of the trading 
institution and trader attributes. 
Experimentalists who induce demand and supply typically use a special case of this framework. The 
number of goods is    .    is a fictitious good being traded, with price  , and    is experimental 
money, which is the numeraire. The  traders are divided into    buyers and   sellers          . 
A buyer   has the production function           , the endowment         , and the utility function: 
       
          
             
  
where    is known as  ‟s value. These conditions imply that a buyer will purchase one unit of    if and 
only if      and will otherwise consume his endowment. 
A seller   has the production function                   , the endowment         , and the utility 
function: 
         
where    is known as  ‟s cost. These conditions imply that a seller will produce and sell one unit of    if 
and only if      and will otherwise consume his endowment. 
Finally, units of utility are exchanged for real money at some fixed rate. Utility is transferrable. This 
framework is employed in conjunction with a variety of trading institutions, including Chamberlin 
markets (Chamberlin 1948), double oral auctions (Smith 1965) and so on. 
Hayek‟s theories 
In contrast to the general framework above, Hayek (1940, 1967) argues against a model of behavior 
where agents‟ preferences are determined separately from market processes; he believes that the process 
of competition is central to the manner in which agents assess how much they value commodities. At face 
value, this poses difficulties for inducing preferences (Smith 1976) in an experiment. 
To overcome this, Smith (1982) relaxed some of the Hayekian assumptions, noting that much of what 
Hayek proposed about markets applies in principle even if preferences can be induced. We follow Smith 
(1982) and thus the hypotheses that we present and test can be considered as (Vernon) Smithian 
interpretations of Hayek. 
Smith (1982) remarks that the standard proposition of decentralized market theory is that the gains from 
trade will be exhausted; further, prices will converge to the competitive equilibrium implied by the 
intersection of demand and supply. The divergence between Hayek and neoclassical scholars arises when 
one considers the conditions necessary for these outcomes, and the precise mechanism by which the 
competitive equilibrium is attained (see the section on alternative theories below). 
As Smith (2008: pxiv) has more recently stated it, “Experiments constituted a substitute for the missing 
dynamic process analysis that had not been part of the standard equilibrium tool kit that had only focused 
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only on what might be the equilibrium shadow cast ahead by any such process.” Experimental economics 
in other words was providing a demonstration of what Hayek was talking about in terms of “knowledge-
acquisition” and the dynamic adjustments that characterize the entrepreneurial market process.  
Hayek had long argued that the preoccupation with the equilibrium state of affairs had clouded economic 
analysis. It is important to stress that Hayek never rejected equilibrium economics, but he wanted to shift 
the analytical focus of economists to the processes of knowledge-acquisition and communication by 
economic actors such that would bring about the equilibrium state of affairs. 
Hayek coming out of the Viennese tradition of economics had always focused on the step-by-step, or 
process analysis, as opposed to either the Walrasian or Marshallian traditions of price theory (see, e.g., 
Mayer 1932). But the socialist calculation debate sharpened his focus in this regard and led him beginning 
in the 1930s (e.g., Hayek 1937) to continually stress the institutionally context-dependent nature of 
economic knowledge, and the necessity of the competitive market process for the generation of, the 
discovery of, and use of the relevant knowledge that coordinates economic activity through time. The 
model of market socialism that Oskar Lange and Abba Lerner proposed had in effect solved the problem 
of economic calculation by hypothesis, and in so doing lost sight of the vital role that institutions play in 
coordinating the plans of economic actors. There is, Hayek argues, “something fundamentally wrong with 
an approach which habitually disregards an essential part of the phenomena with which we have to deal: 
the unavoidable imperfection of man‟s knowledge and the consequent need for a process by which 
knowledge is constantly communicated and acquired.” (1945: p91). 
Hayek (1941: p17) argued that the goal of economic analysis should be to provide a causal explanation of 
the process in time which brings about the complex coordination of plans. Equilibrium analysis in this 
perspective is “significant only in so far as it is preparatory to this main task.” Economic problems result 
because of changing conditions, and the price system works “as a kind of machinery for registering 
change.” (1945, 87) The structure of property rights and the constellation of prices within the market both 
incentivize and provide guiding signals to actors to coordinate their affairs; absent that context and the 
dispersed knowledge within the economy that resides in specific times and places will not be discovered, 
used, or communicated. 
As Hayek stressed, he was far from denying that equilibrium analysis had a significant role to play in 
economic analysis. But a preoccupation with the equilibrium solution misled leading thinkers into 
ignoring the institutional context of choice and the social process of exchange and production. The market 
economy is an emergent order. Or, as James Buchanan (1963: p29) has put it in a classic paper extending 
Hayek‟s analysis of the market order: 
A market is not competitive by assumption or by construction. A market becomes competitive, and 
competitive rules come to be established as institutions emerge to place limits on individual behavior 
patterns. It is this becoming process, brought about by the continuous pressure of human behavior in 
exchange, that is the central part of our discipline, if we have one, not the dry rot of postulated perfection. 
A solution to a general-equilibrium set of equations is not predetermined by exogenously determined 
rules. A general solution, if there is one, emerges as a result of a whole network of evolving exchanges, 
bargains, trades, side payments, agreements, contracts which, finally at some point, ceases to renew itself. 
At each stage in this evolution toward solution there are gains to be made, there are exchanges possible, 
and this being true, the direction of movement is modified. 
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It is this evolution toward solution that was missing in the formal theory. Vernon Smith (2008: p80) has 
argued that one of the “important contributions of experimental economics has been to enable us to better 
understand the sequential dynamic process whereby markets achieve competitive equilibrium states.” It is 
this discovery process of equilibrium price formation that Hayek complained was ignored with the 
preoccupation with equilibrium modeling, and which Vernon Smith was able to illustrate in his market 
experiments. 
Hypothesis 1 (The Hayek hypothesis; Hayek 1945): A large proportion of efficient rents will be realized 
even if: 
a) The number of traders   is small 
b) Traders can set prices 
c) Traders‟ information about market conditions, including anything beyond own preferences, is highly 
imperfect and incomplete 
d) Traders may or may not have rational expectations (or common knowledge) over market conditions 
e) There is no centralized market orchestrator 
How „large‟? Hayek makes no definitive claims. As we will see in the proceeding hypotheses, he does 
make predictions about factors that improve the functioning of markets, and so it would be inaccurate to 
use full-efficiency as his prediction. Comparing markets to autarky is somewhat of a straw man. Hayek 
was more interested in comparing markets to government-mediated exchange systems, which is difficult 
to implement in a controlled experiment (field or otherwise). As regards the laboratory experimental 
literature, an informal and arbitrary heuristic that has emerged suggests that realized rents of 90% or 
above is considered „large‟. 
Moving on to the next hypothesis, the prime mover in Hayek‟s understanding of the competitive market 
process is the entrepreneur. Entrepreneurs are forever alert to opportunities for gains from trade and gains 
from innovation, and as such are the change agents within the economic system. “The practical problem is 
not whether a particular method would eventually lead to a hypothetical equilibrium, but which method 
will secure the more rapid and complete adjustment to the daily changing conditions in different places 
and different industries.” (Hayek 1940: p188) Acting on the opportunities for mutual gain that changing 
conditions present, the entrepreneur initiates the necessary adjustments. In examining the market 
economy, Hayek argued, it must never be forgotten that the opportunities for gains from trade and gains 
from innovation have “to be discovered, and to be discovered anew, sometimes almost day to day, by the 
entrepreneur.” (1940: p196). 
Hayek‟s theory of the entrepreneurial market process received its most careful elaboration in the works of 
Israel M. Kirzner, most notably Kirzner (1973). The focus in Kirzner is on the entrepreneurial function 
within the market economy, as opposed to a historical appreciation of any particular entrepreneur. In a 
fundamental sense, all economic actors in the system can be, and in fact are, entrepreneurs. The 
entrepreneur is alert to that which is in their interest to be alert to. In other words, fortune favors the 
prepared mind. If any particular actors fails to discover an opportunity for mutual gain, then another actor 
will step in to realize that opportunity. As long as there exists no impediments to entry, the competitive 
process will reward those with “better ideas or greater willingness to serve the market to offer better 
opportunities.” (Kirzner 1973: p98). 
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In the growing business literature on the cognitive capabilities of entrepreneurs, e.g., Sarasvathy (2008) or 
Bhide (2000, 2008), the focus is on the personal characteristics and conditions of entry, the role of 
financial markets, and the struggles and triumphs of flesh and blood entrepreneurs within the economy. 
The concern is not the entrepreneurial function within the competitive market process. In the Hayek-
Kirzner presentation, the entrepreneur is the agent of change whose activity initiates the necessary relative 
price adjustments that are required to accommodate changing conditions, and lead to the coordinating of 
plans between buyers and sellers such that in the absence of any further change the market will clear. 
Rather than a Walrasian auctioneer reconciling the plans of economic actors in the market, a decentralized 
process of different actors being alert to opportunities for mutual gain drives the coordination of plans. 
Hypothesis 2 (Hayek 1948, 1967): Entrepreneurs have a positive causal effect on the realized proportion 
of efficient rents. 
To test Hypothesis 2, we need to operationalize the concept of an entrepreneur. We argue that in a long-
lived market, trader experience is a decent proxy for entrepreneurial ability. Experienced traders by 
definition have traded more than their inexperienced counterparts. Thus for experience to proxy for 
Hayekian entrepreneurship, all that remains is for their higher volume of trades to reflect successful 
alertness to, and exploitation of, opportunities for mutual gain with other traders. 
This latter point follows from the freedom of entry and exit in a market. If experienced traders were 
simply more experienced in making unprofitable (to themselves) trades, then under a mild form of 
rationality, they would simply exit the market. (Even in the absence of mild rationality, a binding budget 
constraint would limit trading volume.) In contrast if they were experienced in making trades that were 
profitable to themselves but unprofitable to others, then the market would be cannibalized and eventually 
cease to exist; hence our focus on long-lived markets. Thus trading a lot more than others in a long-lived 
market must mean that you are particularly alert to opportunities for mutual gain and are therefore 
instrumental to the process by which efficient rents are realized. 
To avoid the charge of tautology, let us clarify via a thought experiment. Imagine a market with entry and 
exit; as argued above, those adept at efficient trades will accumulate trading experience. Now suppose we 
freeze the market and exogenously alter the composition of experience in the market. If we decrease the 
volume of experienced traders – those who have been in the past successful at realizing efficient trades – 
then from that point onwards the rate at which efficient trades is realized will be diminished compared to 
a control group that experienced no intervention. The reason these people have lasted so long in the 
market is because they are good at spotting opportunities, and the market will suffer for their absence. 
Clearly, experience is not an intrinsic component of the definition of the Hayekian entrepreneur. People 
who are particularly good at realizing efficient trades today may be awful at it tomorrow, and new 
entrepreneurs emerge, both in addition to the tumult that typifies the modern marketplace. However for 
the purposes of laboratory and field experiments conducted over short periods of time, experience is a 
good proxy for the abilities that we are attempting to capture. 
Moving on to the next hypothesis, as we have already argued, in Hayek‟s understanding of the 
competitive market process perfect knowledge cannot be viewed as a precondition for an equilibrium to 
emerge, but instead must be viewed as the defining characteristic of that equilibrium. The competitive 
process generates this knowledge as an outgrowth of the buying and abstaining from buying behavior of 
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individuals within the economy. The optimality conditions of choice and of the system are results of the 
competitive process, and cannot be confused with assumptions of behavior and outcomes going in. 
(Hayek 1937: p42). 
Equilibrium corresponds to a situation where the plans of economic actors on both sides of the market are 
consistent with one another, “or, to put the same thing in less general and less exact but more concrete 
terms, that the expectations of the people and particularly of the entrepreneurs will become more and 
more correct.” (Hayek 1937: p45) But economics as an empirical science, must be able to explain (a) the 
conditions under which the tendency to equilibrium exists, and (b) the process by which individual 
knowledge is acquired, utilized and communicated so that the dovetailing of plans can occur. 
In developing his theory of the market process and the theory of the discovery, use and communication of 
knowledge it is important to stress that Hayek carefully distinguishes between full and complete 
knowledge of the system, and relevant knowledge. His theory works on the discovery and exploitation of 
the relevant knowledge of particular people located in unique time and place. There is a division of 
knowledge in society, that must be coordinated just as the division of labor, to realize the gains from 
social cooperation. But too often in equilibrium economics, “instead of showing what bits of information 
the different persons must possess in order to bring about that result, we fall in effect back on the 
assumption that everybody knows everything and so evade any real solution of the problem.” (Hayek 
1937: p51). 
The relevant knowledge is revealed to individuals through the very process of exchange within the market 
economy as they attempt to better their circumstances. “We must look at the price system as such a 
mechanism for communicating information if we want to understand its real function … The most 
significant fact about this system is the economy of knowledge with which it operates, or how little the 
individual participants need to know in order to be able to take the right action. In abbreviated form, by a 
kind of symbol, only the most essential information is passed on and passed on only to those concerned.” 
(Hayek 1945: p86). 
Hypothesis 3 (Hayek 1948, 1945): Increasing the availability of information about trade prices has a 
positive causal effect on the realized proportion of efficient rents. 
With the exception of Hypothesis 3, there are no testable predictions about prices. In contrast in the 
conventional Walrasian model, since traders are assumed to be price-takers, the only price that guarantees 
the realization of first-best trades is the market-clearing price, and so the model makes a very specific, 
testable prediction about prices. 
The final hypothesis relates to asymmetric information. Neoclassical economics started to formally 
analyze the consequences of asymmetric information in the 1970s. Early studies focused on 
demonstrating how asymmetric information could be a barrier to efficient trade (e.g., Akerlof 1970). 
Subsequent studies have explored institutions that can limit the damaging effects of asymmetric 
information (e.g., Spence 1973), and the mechanism design literature uncovered clever contracts that 
could, under certain conditions, resecure first-best efficiency. Important contributions included the folk 
theorem and the reputational signaling literature (Kreps and Wilson 1982), which established that 
reputational concerns could help overcome asymmetric information problems. 
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Hayek analyzed the causes and consequences of asymmetric information, though without the formal, 
game-theoretic tools of the 1970s and 1980s. As we have seen Hayek‟s theory of the market process 
focuses on the division of knowledge in society, and as such postulates a universal condition of 
asymmetric information. “In actual life the fact that our inadequate knowledge of the available 
commodities or services,” Hayek wrote, “is made up for by our experience with the persons or firms 
supplying them – that competition is in large measure competition for reputation or good will – is one of 
the most important facts which enable us to solve our dialing problems.” (Hayek 1948: p97, emphasis 
added) Competition teaches us precisely who will best serve us within the market. 
Furthermore, in Hayek‟s understanding the functional significance of competition in ensuring this 
disciplining through competition was not limited to the state of “perfect competition”. Focusing on the 
model of perfect competition “tends to conceal from us the important fact that competition is more 
important the more complex or „imperfect‟ are the objective conditions in which it has to operate. Indeed, 
far from competition being beneficial only when it is „perfect,‟ I am inclined to argue that the need for 
competition is nowhere greater than in fields in which the nature of the commodities or services makes it 
impossible that it ever should create a perfect market in the theoretical sense.” (Hayek 1948: p103-104). 
As Vernon Smith (2008: p104) has put it: “If human agents with private and therefore inherently 
universal asymmetric information can converge to equilibrium outcomes by means that theorists can 
neither model nor predict, why would you believe that the market failure theorems derived from 
asymmetric information apply to those agents?” Knowledge is dispersed, but coordinated through the 
price system; competition disciplines through the profit and loss mechanism. Relevant knowledge is 
communicated to decision makers, and reputations are earned and lost based on the judgment of buyers 
within the market. Competition compels individuals to constantly “adjust their way of life” to adapt to the 
rapidly changing circumstances on which economic growth and development depends. (see Hayek 1968, 
189) “We are left,” Smith argues, “with Hayek‟s critique [of equilibrium theory], his statement of the 
problem solved by decentralized pricing, and the experimental evidence supporting Hayekian efficiency 
in a wide variety of environments and institutions, but the theory show how this works eludes articulation 
by means of the economist‟s standard tool-kit.” (2008: p107). 
Following Smith, we want to see if field experiments find Hayekian efficiency to be as robust as has been 
found in the laboratory environment. 
Hypothesis 4 (Hayek 1948): In markets with acute asymmetric information, introducing a reputation 
mechanism has a positive causal effect on the realized proportion of efficient rents. 
Alternatives to the Hayek hypothesis 
In addition to describing and testing the Hayek hypothesis, Smith (1982) discussed two alternatives. The 
price-taking hypothesis (Cournot 1838, Edgeworth 1881) is the foundation for Walrasian and neoclassical 
general equilibrium theory. In contrast to the Hayek hypothesis, it predicts efficiency if the number of 
traders is so large (infinitely large) that each trader has an imperceptible impact upon prices, while 
retaining the assumption of economy of information available to each agent. Modern bargaining models 
(e.g., Gale 1987) relax the assumption of large numbers of agents at the expense of requiring ex ante 
complete knowledge of demand and supply; Smith termed this the complete knowledge hypothesis. It is 
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his dissatisfaction with both these classes of model that drove Smith towards testing the Hayek 
hypothesis. 
4. Field experimental evidence on Hayek’s theories 
Our operationalized versions of Hayek‟s theories have been reduced to statements about the causal effect 
of features of the trading institution and trader attributes on the efficiency of resulting allocations. Smith 
(1982) handled the laboratory experimental evidence. We here present the field experimental evidence. 
Hypothesis 1: The Hayek Hypothesis 
They key field experiments are List (2004a) and List and Price (2006). In the first set of experiments 
described in List (2004a), a variety of markets are considered where              , a small 
number, especially when compared to the asymptotic numbers called for in the Walrasian model. There 
are three market types: symmetric, shown in Figure 1, asymmetric demand elastic and asymmetric supply 
elastic. 
 
Figure 1: Values/costs in symmetric markets in List (2004a) 
In the symmetric markets, the distributions of values/costs implies that it is efficient for the 7 buyers who 
have a value strictly above $13 to trade with the 7 sellers who have a cost strictly below $14. Each trader 
is aware of his value/cost only. In the asymmetric demand (supply) elastic markets, supply (demand) was 
unchanged while demand (supply) was perfectly elastic at a price of $13.50, implying that it was efficient 
for any 7 of the 12 buyers (sellers) to trade. 
The trading institution is decentralized multilateral bargaining (Chamberlin market) adapted to trading 
conventions for professional sports memorabilia. In real, non-experimental trading conventions, the role 
of sellers is taken by professional dealers, who rent tables in large exhibition halls and display their wares. 
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These traders usually have extensive experience and knowledge about the value of the commodities both 
to themselves and more generally in the market. The role of buyers is mostly taken by amateur sports 
memorabilia enthusiasts who have substantially less experience than the dealers and attend the 
conventions as non-dealers. The buyers mill around, examining the dealers‟ wares, bargaining within 
earshot of other traders and striking deals. 
List (2004a) virtually replicated this environment with a few modifications to permit the control necessary 
for inducing values/costs. He recruited the participants inside an actual trading convention and ran it 
there.
7
 Recruited dealers were assigned the role of sellers and recruited non-dealers took the role of 
buyers; the sellers retained their real, rented desks and the buyers milled around (they had a map that 
clearly indicated the locations of the desks). The non-standard subject pool and the allocation of subjects 
to roles that mimicked their natural roles meant that this was a framed field experiment (Harrison and List 
2004) in contrast to the laboratory experiments reviewed in Smith (1982); see the discussion in Section 2 
for the advantages that this conferred. Participants took part in five rounds of play in the same market, and 
the experiment lasted around 60 minutes. 
  Market period 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Symmetric markets 
Average price 13.5 13.9 13.7 13.8 13.1 
Quantity 7.3 8 7 7 7.3 
Efficiency 89% 85% 88% 87% 95% 
Number of sessions 6 6 6 6 6 
 
Asymmetric demand elastic markets 
Average price 12.4 12.4 13.1 13.1 13.1 
Quantity 5.7 6 6.6 7 6.3 
Efficiency 87% 90% 99% 100% 90% 
Number of sessions 6 6 6 6 6 
 
Asymmetric supply elastic markets 
Average price 15.9 16.1 14.4 13.9 13.7 
Quantity 3.6 4.3 6.3 7 6.3 
Efficiency 73% 80% 96% 100% 96% 
Number of sessions 6 6 6 6 6 
Table 1: Main sample statistics from Experiment 1 in List (2004a) 
The principal difference between List‟s (2004a) environment and a real trading convention is that a 
unique, homogenous commodity was being traded and its values/costs were induced in the standard 
manner used in laboratory market experiments (Smith 1976). Traders were told that the values/costs of 
others could differ, but no additional information about the distribution of values/costs was provided. List 
(2004a) was therefore a framed field experiment that satisfied conditions (a) to (e) in Hypothesis 1. 
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 Potential participants were approached in the convention and offered the opportunity to participate in an 
experiment in exchange for the opportunity to earn money. Participants were taken to a room where they had the 
instructions and rules read out aloud to them. 
13 
 
Table 1 contains the data‟s principal features. Note that average prices are prices averaged across the 
multiple traders within a session and across sessions, whereas all other variables only have one 
observation per session and thus are averaged only across sessions. 
The simple average of efficiency in the 90 sessions in Table 1 is 90%, rising to 95% if we focus purely on 
the 54 sessions in market periods 3-to-5. 
List (2004a) also conducted the similar experiments but with children under the age of 13 randomly 
assigned to the role of buyer or seller. Sessions used one of two demand and supply systems: 24-children 
sessions used the system in Figure 1, while 12-children sessions used a condensed version that required 4 
trades for full efficiency. The 24-children sessions were always run with children with randomly varying 
real trading experience. There were three types of 12-chilrden sessions: those with children whose 
experience varied randomly, those with experienced children and those with inexperienced children.
8
 
Similar to the adult sessions, all children gained substantial experience during the experiment by 
participating in five market periods. 
  Market period 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Symmetric markets: 24 random children 
Quantity 3 3.7 6 6.3 7.7 
Efficiency 43% 40% 71% 84% 95% 
Number of sessions 6 6 6 6 6 
 
Symmetric markets: 12 random children 
Quantity 2 3 4 4 3 
Efficiency 59% 18% 91% 100% 97% 
Number of sessions 2 2 2 2 2 
 
Symmetric markets: 12 experienced children 
Quantity 3 4 3 4 3 
Efficiency 68% 100% 82% 100% 97% 
Number of sessions 2 2 2 2 2 
 
Symmetric markets: 12 inexperienced children 
Quantity 1 3 3 3 2 
Efficiency 35% 62% 47% 29% 71% 
Number of sessions 2 2 2 2 2 
Table 2: Sample statistics for children from Experiment 1 in List (2004a) 
The main sample statistics are in Table 2. Average efficiency across all sessions and periods is 69%, 
which is substantially lower than for adults, though still large compared to the 0 efficiency of autarky. For 
(naturally) experienced children only, efficiency is 89%, and across all sessions but only for the last two 
periods, efficiency is 87%.  
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 Experienced children have traded more than 12 times per month in the last two years. Inexperienced children have 
traded less than one time per month in the last two years. 
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These data are complemented by regressions on the adults‟ experiments that control for the effect of a 
variety of naturally-occurring and experimentally-manipulated regressors; List (2004a) found that more 
experienced traders (on both sides of the markets) earned more than their less-experienced counterparts. 
Together, these data are consistent with Hayek‟s (1945) claim that a crucial component of the market 
mechanism was the natural selection it imposed upon traders: poor traders would be eliminated and 
superior traders would survive (and thrive). 
To explore the robustness of his results from sports memorabilia trading conventions, List (2004a) 
collected data in a market for a different type of collectible (collector pins). This latter market was 
dominated by women, unlike the male-dominated sports memorabilia markets. Using the 12-trader 
versions of systems in Figure 1, List found efficiency levels that were virtually identical to those in the 
preceding experiments. 
List and Price (2006) extends the design in List (2004a) with three new sessions using the same demand 
and supply system as in Figure 1, but with four sellers each selling three units (rather than 12 sellers each 
selling one unit). All other features are identical. The resulting efficiency levels for periods 1-to-5 were 
95%, 98%, 96%, 98% and 94% respectively, lending further support to the data in List (2004a). (They 
also ran sessions where they facilitated collusion; we discuss these below.) 
Result 1: A large proportion of efficient rents are realized even if the five conditions in Hypothesis 1 
hold. 
In a follow-up paper based on the data from List (2004) and List and Price (2006), Bramoulle et al. (2011) 
investigate the source of the small efficiency losses observed in the Chamberlin markets. Using a 
combination of simulation and empirical analysis, they conclude that some of the efficiency losses are due 
to relationships forming between traders even in the presence of perfect external enforcement of trading 
contracts. These relationships, which they argue reflect preferences for bargaining with people who have 
a similar bargaining style, increase the likelihood that an extramarginal trader secures a trade with an 
intramarginal trader.  
Result 1 is consistent with the laboratory data synthesized by Smith (1982). While collecting data from 
field experiments has not changed the conclusion emerging from laboratory studies, it has made us more 
confident in their generalizability. For example, the cited field experiments demonstrate that the 
laboratory results are robust to the presence of participants with years of experience, and such experience 
levels are common in many naturally-occurring markets.
9
 Moreover, allowing participants to self-select 
into their natural roles does not alter Result 1. In both cases, there are examples in other fields where 
results are sensitive to such differences (see Levitt and List 2007), and so there is always value in running 
field experiments to explore robustness. 
Hypothesis 2: Entrepreneurs and efficiency 
List (2002) virtually replicates the experimental design in List (2004a) but systematically varies the 
experience-level of the traders on each side of the market in markets populated by adults. List ran four 
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 In List‟s experiments in sports memorabilia conventions, average trader experience for dealers (non-dealers) is 
around 10 (7) years with a standard deviation of around 7 (10) years. 
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versions of the 24-trader market in Figure 1: (1) random levels of experience for all traders, (2) 
experienced buyers with inexperienced sellers, (3) experienced buyers with experienced sellers, and (4) 
inexperienced buyers with experienced sellers. The results are in Table 3. Unlike List (2004), the sample 
is quite small: List only ran one session of each version in Table 3, and so the results should be 
interpreted cautiously. 
  Market period 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Random 
Quantity 8 9 7 7 7 
Efficiency 89% 86% 86% 97% 97% 
 
Experienced buyers/Inexperienced sellers 
Quantity 7 8 7 6 8 
Efficiency 84% 97% 97% 95% 95% 
 
Experienced buyers/Experienced sellers 
Quantity 8 7 7 9 7 
Efficiency 86% 80% 81% 78% 95% 
 
Inexperienced buyers/Experienced sellers 
Quantity 6 7 6 7 7 
Efficiency 95% 81% 95% 59% 97% 
Table 3: Sample statistics from List (2002) 
Somewhat surprisingly, the prevalence of entrepreneurs seems to have a non-monotonic effect on the 
realization of rents. Efficiency is highest when buyers are experienced and sellers inexperienced (93%), 
and lowest when both are experienced (82%). Estimating rents as a function of the presence of 
experienced traders at the level of the individual (thereby creating 24 observations per session) confirms 
that this difference is statistically significant. 
List and Price (2006) provides evidence in support of Hypothesis 2, but the data are more difficult to 
interpret. In addition to the 12 single-unit buyer, 4 3-unit seller markets described above, they also ran 
sessions where the 4 sellers were allowed to meet privately and collude. In some of the sessions, sellers 
clearly succeeded in collusively improving their rents at the expense of global efficiency. The authors did 
not explicitly manipulate the experience level of the buyers; however they found that when at least one 




So far we have only considered double auctions, i.e., where both buyers and sellers can offer trade prices. 
Harrison and List (2008) conduct field experiments in a single auction environment. Their goal is to study 
the incidence of the winner‟s curse (WC): in common-value auctions with imperfect information and 
private signals above the common value, the tendency for participants to overbid. 
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 The (collusive) sellers were always experienced traders (dealers), and so we cannot estimate the impact of 
experience (and hence entrepreneurship) on efficiency on the seller side. 
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Harrison and List‟s first study is an artefactual field experiment. They recruit dealers and non-dealers 
from the floor of a sports memorabilia convention; the total number of participants in each auction   is 
either 4 or 7. There is an item whose value   is drawn randomly from the range [$40,$200]; each of the 
bidders receives a private signal of the value distributed uniformly in the range          , where   
was either $6 or $12 depending on the treatment. In symmetric sessions, all bidders received an IID 
private signal; in asymmetric sessions, all but one received an IID private signal, and the last bidder was 
an insider who knew the exact common value. All these facts were common knowledge. 
Ex post efficiency requires that the item be transferred to the highest bidder if and only if the bidder‟s 
value exceeds the seller‟s value (the value is common across bidders only). If the winning bid is always 
(weakly) less than the bidder‟s value, then it is impossible for the bidder to inefficiently purchase the 
good. A necessary condition for a potentially inefficient purchase by the bidder is that the bidder bid 
above his value, and this is the principal efficiency concern underlying the WC. Thus the more likely are 
bidders to bid above the actual common value, the more likely an inefficient allocation. 
Information 
treatment 
  Artefactual Framed 
 
N = 4 N = 7 N = 4 
Symmetric 
Mean dealer bid - Mean non-dealer bid -$2.23 -$2.40 -$1.21 
% of dealer bids exceeding WC threshold 5% 7% - 
% of non-dealer bids exceeding WC threshold 38% 47% - 
Observations 96 98 64 
Asymmetric 
Mean dealer bid - Mean non-dealer bid -$3.50 -$3.92 -$2.31 
% of dealer bids exceeding WC threshold 32% 26% - 
% of non-dealer bids exceeding WC threshold 81% 79% - 
Observations 112 49 60 
Table 4: Sample statistics from Harrison and List (2008) 
In these experiments, the common value was always $94.33. Harrison and List found that in all 
treatments, bidders show a non-trivial tendency to bid in excess of $94.33, however the dealers, who 
represent the entrepreneurs, are less likely to suffer from this potential source of inefficiency. The main 
results are in Table 4.
11
 In the columns for the artefactual field experiment, we can see that in all 
treatments, dealers on average bid lower than do non-dealers (these differences are statistically 
significantly different from zero). Moreover, dealers are across-the-board less likely to bid in excess of 
the WC threshold. 
The second study was a framed field experiment with an analogous setup, but where the item to be 
auctioned was a pack of sports cards that potentially contained some valuable cards, implying that the 
item‟s value was homegrown rather than induced. As can be seen in the last column of Table 4, dealers 
again bid less than non-dealers on average, though since homegrown values are unobservable, it is 
impossible to definitively claim that the non-dealers were overbidding. 
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 The percentages are approximate since they are retrieved from eye-balling data displayed in bar charts. 
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Alevy et al. (2007) study how imperfect information can hamper the efficiency of financial markets. The 
true state of the world is        . A set of agents             does not know the state of the world, 
but each receives an independent signal          about the state where                 and 
               . The first agent sees his signal and chooses         , his guess about the true state 
of the world; the second agent sees his own signal and   , and then makes his guess,   . Each agent sees 
the choices of all preceding agents, in addition to his own signal, before making his choice. After all 
agents have guessed the state of the world, the true state is revealed; agents who guessed correctly 
       earn one unit; those who guessed incorrectly earn zero. 
The actual probabilities, which are common knowledge, imply that cascades can form. A cascade occurs 
when an agent‟s rational guess (in the Bayesian sense) about the state of the world is based purely on the 
history of guesses and is insensitive to his private signal. When a cascade commences, the stock of useful 
information based on the agents‟ private signals and embodied in their decisions ceases to grow, despite 
the fact that a large number of agents could correctly guess the state of the world with near certainty if 
they pooled their private information. From an efficiency viewpoint, of particular concern is the 
possibility of a reverse cascade, whereby agents rationally herd on the incorrect state. 
Generalizations of the model presented in Alevy et al. (2007) are widely applied to markets for assets 
with uncertain payoffs. Firms issue assets in exchange for investors‟ capital. The main question is if the 
imperfect information impedes the markets‟ ability to allocate capital to investment projects efficiently. 
The literature on cascades in financial markets has been used to argue against the Hayek hypothesis, since 
reverse cascades constitute failures to realize efficient outcomes. 
Alevy et al. (2007) run a laboratory experiment and a framed field experiment in an environment 
described by the above model. Participants are recruited and play 15 rounds in groups of five or six. In the 
laboratory version, participants are college students; the framed field version, the participants are 
professional traders from the Chicago Board of Trade. The professional traders correspond to Hayekian 
entrepreneurs since arbitrage is their primary activity. 
The authors vary the probabilities across sessions to explore the determinants of any cascades, though this 
is not directly related to Hypothesis 2. They also vary the frame between gains and losses. 
Participants Observations Reverse cascades 
College students 822 37 (4.5%) 
Market professionals 825 18 (2.1%) 
Table 5: Sample statistics from Alevy et al. (2007) 
Table 5 contains the main data on reverse cascades. In aggregate, reverse cascades are quite infrequent, 
occurring 3.3%. However when we differentiate between the markets populated by Hayekian 
entrepreneurs (market professionals) and those composed of non-entrepreneurs (college students), we can 
see that the Hayekian entrepreneurs generate less than half the proportion of reverse cascades (this 
difference is significant at the 5% level).
12
 In results that we will discuss more fully below, market 
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 Hussam et al. (2008) is a laboratory study of the effect of experience on asset bubble formation. Whereas earlier 
studies (e.g., Smith et al. 1988) found that experience diminished the incidence of bubbles, Hussam et al. (2008) 
interacted experience with characteristics and demonstrated that experience fails to universally mitigate against 
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professionals‟ behavior – unlike that of college students – is unaffected by payoffs being framed as gains 
vs. losses. 
The literature on the endowment effect offers important data on the causal effect of Hayekian 
entrepreneurs on efficiency. The endowment effect is defined as a large discrepancy between the amount 
an individual is willing to pay to acquire a good and the amount he must be paid to relinquish the same 
good once it has come into his possession (the latter exceeding the former). It is „large‟ in the sense that it 
cannot be plausibly explained by income effects, and that it is a consequence of loss-aversion (Tversky 
and Kahneman 1991) and/or the human affinity for physical possessions once they have been acquired. 
For example, people tend to become very fond of mass-produced, cheap pens once they have used them. 
In the classic Walrasian markets model, a trader‟s final allocation under the competitive (and efficient) 
equilibrium is not affected by variations in his endowment conditional on the value of his endowment at 
the equilibrium price vector. The price mechanism still guarantees that goods will flow to those who 
value them the most. This process is impeded by the endowment effect; if initial endowments are at least 
partially arbitrary, then the endowment effect acts as an inefficient transactions cost. It makes traders who 
„ought‟ to sell their good reluctant to do so, limiting the realization of efficient rents (see List 2003 for a 
discussion). 
Consequently, if the endowment effect is somewhat prevalent and Hayekian entrepreneurs suffer less 
from it than do non-entrepreneurial traders, then this would constitute evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2. 
Several field experiments on the endowment effect provide such data. 
List (2003) invites dealers and non-dealers at sports memorabilia conventions to participate in a short 
survey in exchange for a piece of sports memorabilia. List chose two approximately equally valued 
goods: A (a ticket stub from a famous baseball game) and B (a certificate commemorating a momentous 
achievement by a famous baseball player). People who agree to participate in the survey experience the 
following: 
1. They are physically handed one of the two goods (chosen at random) 
2. They fill out the survey (which takes around five minutes) 
3. The remaining good is offered to them in exchange for the first good, and they decide if they 
want to trade or not 
4. They complete a short exit survey 
There were several noteworthy features of the design. First, the participants had the good in their physical 
possession while they filled out the survey, which has been shown to enhance the endowment effect. 
Second, pre-testing ensured that the two goods were of equal value. Third, the goods were chosen on the 
basis that they would be consumed rather than sold elsewhere, and the exit interview confirmed that this 
was the case for 95% of the participants. 
                                                                                                                                                                           




Sample Variable Percent traded 
Pooled (n = 148) 
Received A and traded for B 32.8 
Received B and traded for A 34.6 
Dealers (n = 74) 
Received A and traded for B 45.7 
Received B and traded for A 43.6 
Non-dealers (n = 74) 
Received A and traded for B 20.0 
Received B and traded for A 25.6 
Table 6: Sample statistics from Experiment 1 in List (2003) 
The results are in Table 6. In the pooled data, List found data consistent with previous demonstrations of 
the endowment effect: the sum of the percentages of those who traded A for B and B for A is 68%, which 
is significantly less than 100%. However when List broke the sample down into dealers and non-dealers, 
he found that the endowment effect was almost exclusively driven by non-dealers: the sum of the two 
percentages was 89% for dealers (not significantly different from 100%) and 46% for non-dealers 
(significantly less than 100%). 
Additional robustness tests confirmed the basic result. Thus, for example, dividing the sample of non-
dealers into experienced- and inexperienced dealers reveals that experienced non-dealers are substantially 
less likely to suffer from the endowment effect. Controlling for observable attributes, such as 
demographics, in a regression does not alter the main result. List also conducted an analogous experiment 
in a pin-trading market and found similar results. Using a similar environment, List (2004b) also finds 
evidence that experienced traders are less likely to suffer from the endowment effect. Finally as 
mentioned above, Alevy et al. (2007) and Haigh and List (2009) found that professional traders playing 
Bayesian signal-extraction games were less likely to suffer from loss-aversion. 
In contrast to List (2003, 2004b), Alevy et al. (2007) and Haigh and List (2009), a study by Haigh and 
List (2005) finds that professional traders are more likely to suffer from myopic loss aversion than college 
students, and that they suffer from it quite acutely. They employ the design of Gneezy and Potters (1997): 
in each round of a game, participants are asked to decide how many of 100 units to invest in a risky 
project that returns 2.5 units per unit invested with probability 1/3 and nothing with probability 2/3. This 
game is played for nine rounds. 
In the frequent treatment, each participants receives feedback about his earnings at the end of each round 
and before making his choice for the next round. In the infrequent treatment, participants made their 
choices for three consecutive rounds and received feedback only about their aggregate earnings and only 
at the end of the three rounds. Thus the payoff structure was identical across treatments, but a loss is more 
likely to be perceived in the frequent treatment because feedback is more frequent. Myopically loss averse 
individuals should invest more in the infrequent treatment. Similar to the endowment effect, this cognitive 
bias impedes efficient trade. 
Haigh and List (2005) run the experiments on a group of college students and a group of professional 
traders from the Chicago Board of Trade (an artefactual field experiment). They find that both college 
students and professional traders suffer from myopic loss aversion. They also find that professional 
traders invested less than college students in the frequent treatment and more than them in the infrequent 
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treatment, rendering them more acute sufferers of myopic loss aversion. Unfortunately the authors do not 
attempt to reconcile this finding with the more common finding that professionals are less likely to suffer 
from behavioral anomalies. 
Result 2: Generally speaking, entrepreneurs have a positive causal effect on the realized proportion of 
efficient rents, though there are some exceptions. 
Similar to Result 1, Result 2 is also supported by a wealth of laboratory data, e.g., for analyses of the role 
of experience, see Smith et al. (1988) and Plott and Zeiler (2005); but this again does not undermine the 
usefulness of complementing the laboratory evidence with field experiments in light of the reasons for 
plausibly expecting differences (Levitt and List 2007). Moreover field data allows one to dig deeper into 
the causal mechanisms, e.g., using a structural model, List (2003) compares treatment and selection as 
reasons why traders in a specific, naturally-occurring market suffer less from the endowment effect. 
Hypothesis 3: Price information and efficiency 
Recall that in List and Price (2006), the authors ran Chamberlin markets with 4 sellers each selling 3 
units, and 12 buyers each buying 1 unit (the system is depicted in Figure 1). This was a framed field 
experiment because the sellers were dealers and the buyers were non-dealers, all recruited from sports 
memorabilia conventions. In a subset of sessions, the sellers were allowed to privately collude for a few 
minutes prior to the start of trading. These sessions were divided into two types: perfect information 
sessions, where after each trade, the transaction price was declared publicly; and imperfect information 
sessions, where after each trade, the transaction price plus a uniformly distributed white noise term was 
declared publicly. The information structure was common knowledge. Thus the perfect information 
sessions correspond to a greater availability of information about trade prices. 
  Market period 
  1 2 3 4 5 
 
Perfect information (3 sessions) 
Quantity 4.7 4.3 5 4.7 5 
Efficiency 84% 84% 86% 86% 90% 
 
Imperfect information (3 sessions) 
Quantity 5.3 5.7 5.7 6.3 5.7 
Efficiency 97% 92% 84% 91% 92% 
Table 3: Sample statistics from List and Price (2006) 
Table 7 contains the main results. Average efficiency is 86% in the perfect information sessions and 91% 
in the imperfect information sessions. Using a Mann-Whitney test, this difference is marginally 
significant (p < 7%), and it contradicts Hypothesis 3. The explanation is that when price information is 
transmitted perfectly, it is relatively straightforward for sellers to monitor other sellers and enforce the 
terms of a cartel, which are inefficiently high prices. 
In additional sessions where the buyers were experienced, List and Price (2006) found that both treatment 
and control delivered (approximately) efficient outcomes. 
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the only field experiment in which an investigator has 
experimentally manipulated the dissemination of price information. Since the context is very narrow, we 
are cautious in generalizing the conclusion to other, more frequently-occurring contexts (such as those 
considered in List 2004a).
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Result 3: There is some evidence that increasing the availability of information about trade prices has a 
negative causal effect on the realized proportion of efficient rents. 
Laboratory experiments have been employed to study similar questions, with similar conclusions (Davis 
and Holt 1998, Feinberg and Snyder 2002). The principle difference between the framed field experiment 
in List and Price (2006) and the aforementioned laboratory studies is the natural, endogenous selection in 
roles, which the authors expected to potentially yield different results. A novel result in List and Price 
(2006) was the sensitivity of the effect of more accurate price information to the presence of experienced 
buyers, though admittedly this can also be tested in a laboratory setting. Regardless, as with previous 
results in this paper, the field permitted the researchers to observe how experience at the level of years 
affected conclusions. 
Hypothesis 4: Asymmetric information, reputation and efficiency 
Experimentally modifying the extent of reputational concerns in a naturally-occurring market is difficult. 
List (2006) designs a field experiment around a fortuitously-timed natural experiment to generate data 
relevant to this Hypothesis 4. 
List (2006) builds on the laboratory gift exchange literature (Fehr et al. 1993), which is similar in 
structure to the trust game (Berg et al. 1995) and is essentially a sequential prisoner‟s dilemma. A sender 
and responder participate in a one-shot interaction. The sender sends an amount         to the 
responder, retaining       for himself. The amount   is tripled, disclosed to the receiver and then the 
receiver unilaterally chooses how much to return to the sender,          , keeping the remaining 
       for himself. The final payoffs are               . 
Efficiency requires    , while the unique subgame Nash equilibrium is               . This game 
is considered an allegory for various market transactions with asymmetric information, such as worker 
effort under incomplete labor contracts (Fehr et al. 1993) or product quality in markets with unobservable 
quality (Akerlof 1970). The responder takes the role of the party with private information, and the 
opportunity to exploit that information can prevent the realization of efficient exchange. Despite a 
vigorous debate over the interpretation of laboratory results of gift exchange games (see Levitt and List 
2007), to the best of our knowledge, List (2006) was the first field experimental test (presumably because 
it is difficult to locate an environment genuinely devoid of reputational concerns). 
List‟s design is again based on sports memorabilia markets. Subjects are instructed to approach dealers 
and offer them a low fixed amount or a large fixed amount for a piece of sports memorabilia of a certain 
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 In Chamberlin (1948), decentralized markets with limited diffusion of price and bid/offer information failed to 
converge to the competitive equilibrium. Smith (1962, 1965) did converge to the equilibrium principally because of 
the publicity of information on prices, bids and offers (the market institution was a double oral auction). In our 
opinion, this is a much more generalizeable context of the effect of transmitting additional price information. 
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quality. To an inexperienced buyer, quality is difficult to measure, and so the seller has an opportunity to 
„defect‟ and deliver low quality. If ex post quality is sufficiently low and unaffected by the offer price, 
then this will dissuade buyers from initiating a purchase and will result in a failure to realize efficient 
trades. 
List interacts the primary treatment variable (offered price) with two other explanatory variables. The first 
is whether or not the approached dealers are local, which is a sufficient condition for the existence of 
reputational concerns: local dealers frequently return to the same conventions and deal with repeat 
customers. 
The second is the existence of third-party quality certification. For one of the items that List instructed 
subjects to purchase, in the early stages of the experiment, there was no third-party quality certification. 
In the experiment‟s latter stages, a third party quality-certifier emerged. The (un)availability of quality 
certification was common knowledge. 
List finds that when third-party quality certification is available, pooled data for dealers exhibits quality 
that is price-contingent. However upon distinguishing between local and non-local dealers, the positive 
relationship exists only for local dealers. In contrast, in the period where quality certification is absent, all 
dealers deliver low quality that is insensitive to offered price.
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These results both support and fail to support Hypothesis 4. The introduction of a reputation mechanism 
(the third-party quality certifier) only aided the realization of efficient trades for local traders. For non-
local traders, the reputational mechanism was too weak to overcome agency problems because of the 
projected infrequency of future interactions in the market. 
To the best of our knowledge, List (2006) is the only field experiment that studies the effect of a quasi-
exogenous shock to the existence of a reputation mechanism. Jin and Kato (2006) and Resnick et al. 
(2006) both study eBay auctions and demonstrate that the reputation mechanism in eBay (buyers rate 
sellers after transactions) works in the sense that sellers with better reputations deliver higher quality 
products. However they do not present evidence of how the introduction of a reputation mechanism 
actually affects the realization of efficient trades. 
Result 4: There is some evidence that in markets with acute asymmetric information, introducing a 
reputation mechanism has a positive causal effect on the realized proportion of efficient rents. 
Laboratory experiments have long been used to study the ability of reputational concerns to overcome 
inefficiencies arising from asymmetric information, starting with repeated prisoner dilemmas. In the 
context of bilateral transactions, there are good reasons to expect social preferences to affect the 
interaction (Fehr et al. 1993), but laboratory experiments suffer from elevated scrutiny levels that 
potentially bias results (Levitt and List 2007). This makes natural field experiments such as List (2006) an 
obvious complement to the laboratory evidence. 
In this sense, the novel (compared to laboratory experiments) result in List (2006) is the uncovering of a 
naturally-occurring reputational mechanism that fails to overcome asymmetric information-induced 
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 List also uses some additional treatments to argue that it is truly reputational concerns rather than selection on 
social preferences that is driving the difference between local and non-local dealers. 
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inefficiencies. Moreover, the use of a field setting allowed List to consider the effect of reputational 
horizons of years (in the case of local dealers), which would be otherwise difficult to induce in a 
laboratory setting. 
5. Conclusion 
Viewed through Vernon Smith‟s (1982) lens, Hayek‟s theories yield multiple testable hypotheses, the 
most important of which is the ability of the market to deliver efficient outcomes despite price-setting, the 
presence of rampant, imperfect/incomplete information and the absence of central market direction. Smith 
examined the laboratory evidence and found strong support for the Hayek hypothesis. 
Market field experiments are a complementary source of evidence that did not exist at the time of Smith‟s 
review. A key advantage of field experiments is that they allow us richer tests of Hayek‟s hypotheses. For 
example, when using experience as a proxy for entrepreneurship, the range of experience that can be 
induced and/or obtained in a standard laboratory experiment is relatively small. In a framed field 
experiment, one can observe differences in experience of years or thousands of trades. Similarly, for 
reputational concerns to affect trading behavior, it is possible that horizons of months and years are 
necessary, and this may be logistically easier to obtain in a field experiment. Certainly we know that real 
markets do have people with years of experience and long reputational horizons interacting, and so 
reproducing that in a (framed) field experiment is a sensible departure point. Whether field experiments 
and laboratory experiments with lower experience levels/shorter horizons produce similar results is an 
open empirical question. Likely the best insights are obtained by combining the two sources of evidence 
and exploiting the advantages of each. 
We find that in general, market field experiments support Hayek‟s theories. Most significantly, and 
reassuringly given Smith‟s (1982) findings, the Hayek hypothesis seems as robust in the field as it is in 
the laboratory. We also find multiple dimensions of evidence supporting Hayek‟s proposition that 
entrepreneurs are a key force in driving markets to equilibrium and in realizing the gains from trade. 
There is a rich tradition among neoclassical economists of studying price dynamics and the market 
process. Somewhat surprisingly, the theoretical literature of the last 30 years has paid little attention to 
Hayek‟s theories, though undoubtedly this is at least partially a consequence of the difficulty of tractably 
formalizing them. Nevertheless we hope that in concert with Smith (1982), this study encourages theorists 
to re-examine Hayek‟s theories. 
We also find that some of the field experimental data is less supportive of Hayek‟s theories. There is 
evidence that reputation cannot alone solve problems of asymmetric information, and the (admittedly very 
narrow) evidence on the effect of disseminating price information poses questions of Hayek‟s claim that it 
promotes efficient trade. 
In the case of the more weakly supported theories, are we to conclude that Hayek was simply wrong? Can 
his theories be refined in response to the findings? Perhaps the data presented are poor tests of Hayek‟s 
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